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INTRODUCTION
Dion Miller is a Black man who worked as a cook for a local diner in
Menomonie, Wisconsin.1 During his year-long employment at Sparx
Restaurant, Mr. Miller rose to the position of assistant kitchen manager,
earning $14 per hour.2 On October 1, 2010, when Mr. Miller arrived at
work for his morning shift, a coworker told him to look at the kitchen
cooler.3 When Mr. Miller looked, he discovered a defaced one dollar bill
that portrayed President Washington with a noose around his neck and a
swastika on his forehead.4 Next to the President’s head was a drawing of
a hooded Klu Klux Klansman, riding on horseback and donning the
infamous hood marked with “KKK.”5 Placed below the bill was a picture
of Gary Coleman, a famous Black child actor.6 Mr. Miller lodged a
complaint about the display, and although the kitchen manager and kitchen
supervisor took responsibility for the spectacle, Sparx refused to terminate
either.7 In fact, Sparx merely gave a warning to the kitchen supervisor,
who was responsible for the defaced bill, and did not discipline the kitchen
manager, who was responsible for the picture of Gary Coleman, at all.8
Before Mr. Miller raised the complaint, his supervisors had never
critiqued his abilities as a cook at Sparx.9 After he filed his complaint,
however, the two men responsible for the incident began to criticize Mr.
Miller’s work performance, and Sparx fired Mr. Miller on October 23,
2010.10 On March 27, 2012, the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a complaint on Mr. Miller’s
behalf, alleging that Sparx’s parent company, North Star Hospitality Inc.
Copyright 2021, by GABRIELLE DOMANGUE.
* J.D./D.C.L. candidate 2022, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. I would like to thank my advisors, Professor Elizabeth R. Carter and
Professor William R. Corbett, for their feedback and guidance throughout the
process. I also want to thank my family, especially my parents, and friends for
their endless love and encouragement.
1. EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898 (No. 14-1660).
2. See N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d at 904; see also Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at
3, N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898 (No. 14-1660).
3. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d at 904.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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(Hospitality), violated Title VII by subjecting Mr. Miller to racial
discrimination and terminating his employment in retaliation for opposing
the harassment.11 The district court awarded Mr. Miller $43,300.50 in back
pay and an additional $6,495.00 to offset his estimated impending incometax liability on the lump-sum back-pay award.12 Back pay consists of the
wages or salary an employee would have received but for the employer’s
unlawful action, such as violating Title VII.13 The additional award to
offset the negative tax consequences, such as the one the district court
awarded Mr. Miller here, is called a “gross-up.”14 Hospitality subsequently
appealed the district court’s holding to the Seventh Circuit.15 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to permit the gross-up to offset
the negative tax consequences of the lump-sum back-pay award.16 Without
the gross-up, the award Mr. Miller received in his Title VII action would
not truly have made him whole.17
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether gross-ups are permitted
for Title VII back-pay awards. Additionally, despite several legislative
attempts to address the issue, Congress has ultimately failed to do so.18
The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits all permit federal district
courts the discretion to award a gross-up for the receipt of a lump-sum
back-pay award.19 Yet the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia refuses to award gross-ups.20 In the D.C. Circuit, victims of
employment discrimination bear the additional tax burden, even though it
was the defendant’s conduct that caused the victim to owe the additional
11. Id.
12. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d at 904.
13. See Back Pay, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The wages
or salary that an employee should have received but did not because of an
employer’s unlawful action in setting or paying the wages or salary.”).
14. See generally Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th
Cir. 2017) (noting that some federal circuits allow lower courts the discretion to
“gross up” an award to account for income tax consequences).
15. See N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d at 901.
16. Id. at 904.
17. See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418–20
(1975) (holding the purpose of Title VII is to make persons whole for injuries
suffered because of unlawful employment discrimination); see also Sears v.
Atchinson, 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding a tax-component
award for lump-sum back-pay awards to make victims of discrimination whole).
18. See H.R. Res. 2509, 113th Cong. (2013); S. Res. 1224, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. Res. 1689, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 1997, 106th Cong. (1999).
19. See Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1116; N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898; Eshelman
v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009); Sears, 749 F.2d 1451.
20. See Dashnaw v. Peña, 12 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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amount in income taxes.21 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Mr. Miller’s
case, without a tax-component award, the employee-plaintiff is not “made
whole;” thus, the award fails to serve the primary purpose of Title VII’s
remedial scheme.22 Without an adjustment for the tax consequences, the
plaintiff continues to suffer from the discrimination endured during
employment.23
The Supreme Court has established that the fundamental purpose of
employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, is to make an
employee whole for injuries suffered due to unlawful discrimination in the
workplace.24 Further, Congress has equipped courts with wide discretion
to ensure victims receive adequate compensation.25 The D.C. Circuit’s
view violates this general rule and prevents employees from becoming
whole.26 Because recent tax reform has failed to address the issue, and
prior attempts at tax relief legislation have continuously failed to become
law, the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split in favor of
permitting gross-ups for lump-sum back-pay awards.27
In addition to permitting gross-ups, the Court must determine what
factors a district court should consider when deciding whether to award a
gross-up. In Eshelman v. Agere Systems, the Third Circuit noted that there
is no presumption in favor of a gross-up award to a plaintiff, and the relief
required to make an employee whole varies from case to case.28
Additionally, in Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc., the Ninth Circuit noted that
in circumstances where the gross-up is difficult to determine or is an
insignificant amount, it would be inappropriate to award a tax
adjustment.29 The Supreme Court should adopt the Clemens framework
and expand upon it to simplify the calculation process for lower courts and
21. Shawn A. Johnson, “Make Whole”: The Need for Gross-Ups in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 17 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 31, 32 (2016).
22. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d at 904; see also Eshelman, 554 F.3d 426; Sears,
749 F.2d 1451.
23. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (holding
that the primary purpose of employment discrimination statutes is to make victims
whole).
24. Id.
25. Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
26. Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1116–17.
27. See sources cited supra note 18. It should also be noted that at the time of
writing, the recent election of a Democratic President and a Democratic controlled
Congress may result in another legislative attempt to address the negative tax
consequences of Title VII lump-sum back-pay awards.
28. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 2009).
29. Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1117.
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to give plaintiffs a better understanding of whether a court will award a
gross-up.30
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I will provide background
on Title VII, detailing federal employment discrimination statutes, the
general purpose of Title VII, available remedies, and legislative attempts
to address the negative tax consequences from Title VII back-pay awards.
Part II will detail the current federal circuit split on whether gross-ups are
permitted for Title VII actions. Next, Part III will establish that Title VII
awards are subject to federal income taxation, providing an overview of
the current tax system and the negative effect it has on lump-sum backpay awards. Part IV will argue that without a gross-up, a victim of
discrimination is not “made whole” and therefore still suffers from the
discriminatory actions of the employer. Additionally, Part IV will
conclude that Congress has equipped courts with wide discretion to ensure
victims receive adequate compensation. This Part will also provide a
solution by exploring what factors district courts should use to determine
whether a gross-up is needed, detailing the circumstances provided in
Clemens, and considering current factors used by district courts where
gross-ups are permitted and awarded.
I. TITLE VII LUMP-SUM BACK-PAY AWARDS: AN OVERVIEW AND
AVAILABLE REMEDIES
The starting point for employment discrimination remedies is Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Congress enacted Title VII in 1964 as a
pivotal piece of legislation for the prevention of employment
discrimination.32 Since the enactment of Title VII, Congress has expanded
available remedies for discrimination victims, while failing to address the
negative tax consequences through legislation.33
A. A Brief Overview of Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII to accomplish “equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
30. Id. (noting that in circumstances where the gross-up is difficult to
calculate or is a small amount, it would be inappropriate to award a gross-up).
31. Richard Barca, Taxing Discrimination Victims: How the Current Tax
Regime is Unjust and Why a Hybrid Income Averaging and Gross Up Remedy
Provides the Most Equitable Solution, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 677
(2011).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 680–83.
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favor . . . white employees over other employees.”34 Under Title VII, it is
unlawful for employers to discriminate against an individual based on a
person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”35 Subsequent
legislation expanded the scope of protections, including the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,36 the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,37 and the Family Medical Leave Act.38 The most
recent expansion of Title VII discrimination coverage occurred through
judicial interpretation—rather than legislation—in the 2020 Supreme
Court case Bostock v. Clayton County.39 In Bostock, the Court held that
discrimination against an individual for being gay or transgender is
unlawful under Title VII.40
Title VII § 706(g) authorizes courts to enjoin employers from
engaging in unlawful employment practices and also to order corrective
action as appropriate.41 These actions may include reinstating or rehiring
employees, with or without back pay.42 In 1972, Congress expanded
courts’ authority by modifying Title VII—adding the phrase “or any other

34. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
35. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII,
§ 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255.
36. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
§ 2(b), 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 621) (enacted to
promote employment of older persons based on ability rather than age and to
prevent age discrimination in the workplace).
37. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213).
38. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 2(b)(1), 107
Stat. 6, 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b)(1)) (enacted to “balance
the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote stability and
economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving
family integrity”).
39. In a class lawsuit, three employees brought suit against prior employers
on the basis of sex discrimination. Gerald Bostock was fired shortly after he began
participating in a gay recreational softball league. Donald Zarda was fired days
after he mentioned being gay. Aimee Stephens presented as a male when she was
hired, and shortly after informing her employer she planned to live and work as a
woman, she was fired from her job at a funeral home. The Supreme Court held
that an employer firing an individual simply for being gay or transgender violated
Title VII. See generally Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
40. See id.
41. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 706(g), 78
Stat. 241, 261.
42. Id.

2022]

COMMENT

603

equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”43 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 further amended Title VII, providing for compensatory and, in some
circumstances, punitive damage awards in cases of intentional
discrimination.44 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory
damages include future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses; but they do not include back pay, interest on back
pay, or any other type of relief already authorized by § 706(g) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.45 The expansion of damages incorporated in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 indicates that Congress sought to increase the means
by which courts could make victims of discrimination whole.46
B. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody: Making an Employee Whole
In the 1975 case Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Supreme Court
established that the fundamental purpose of employment discrimination
statutes is to make an employee whole for injuries suffered as the result of
unlawful discrimination in the workplace.47 In Albemarle, a class of
present and former paper mill employees brought suit against Albemarle
Paper Co. for violating the equal employment opportunity provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.48 After several years of discovery, the
plaintiffs moved to add a demand for back pay.49 The district court found
that Black employees had been placed in lower-paying job classifications
and ordered Albemarle to implement a system of plant-wide seniority.50
The lower court, however, refused to award back pay for losses suffered
43. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86
Stat. 103, 104–07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000)).
44. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. In enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress found that: (1) additional remedies were
needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace; (2) the Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
weakened the scope of effectiveness of federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation was necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2 (citing Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
45. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(A)(b)(2).
46. Tim Canney, Tax Gross-Ups: A Practical Guide to Arguing and
Calculating Awards for Adverse Tax Consequences in Discrimination Suits, 59
CATH. U. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (2010).
47. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
48. Id. at 408–09.
49. Id. at 409.
50. Id.
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under Albemarle’s discriminatory system.51 The Fourth Circuit reversed
the lower court’s holding, ruling that back pay should have been
awarded.52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over
the standard governing back-pay awards.53 The Court noted that, although
it is not an automatic remedy, back pay is an award that lower courts may
invoke.54 Therefore, courts have expansive discretion to help victims of
discrimination.55 More importantly, the Supreme Court held that the
purpose of Title VII is to “make persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination.”56 Accordingly, the
Court remanded the case to the district court to determine the appropriate
relief consistent with this reasoning.57 Though the Supreme Court in
Albemarle failed to address whether gross-ups are permitted for back-pay
awards, it established that when it is not possible or reasonable for a court
to reinstate employment with his or her former employer, the court may
award numerous remedies to make a victim of discrimination whole.58
C. Available Remedies for Title VII Claims
Remedies available to victims in Title VII suits include attorney’s
fees, front pay, and lump-sum back pay.59 Title VII itself permits courts to
award attorney’s fees to successful claimants.60 The Supreme Court in
Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. established that front pay is an
available remedy for Title VII actions.61 Front pay is an award for lost
compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in
lieu of reinstatement.62 Additionally, the Court has held that courts may

51. Id. at 410.
52. Id. at 411–12
53. Id. at 413.
54. Id. at 415–16.
55. See id. at 421.
56. Id. at 419.
57. Id. at 436.
58. See id. at 405; Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843,
846 (2001).
59. See Barca, supra note 31, at 680–83.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“In any action or proceeding under this
chapter the court . . . may allow the prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney’s
fees.”).
61. See Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846.
62. Front Pay, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

2022]

COMMENT

605

grant an employee a lump-sum back-pay award.63 In fact, back pay is the
preferred remedy available to a victim of employment discrimination.64 As
noted in Albemarle, back-pay awards are integral to employment
discrimination laws, and there is a strong presumption in favor of backpay damages for victims of discrimination.65
Lump-sum back-pay awards, however, may cause tax problems for
employees.66 The award may push the employee into a higher tax bracket
in the year of the award, resulting in more federal income tax liability than
if the employer had made the payments over time, as it would have done
if the employer had not engaged in discrimination.67 Nevertheless, only
four federal circuit courts have held that it is appropriate to award grossups for the receipt of lump-sum back-pay awards to offset the negative
federal income tax consequences.68 Without the gross-up, plaintiffs do not
receive their full remedy in a Title VII action.69 The remedy is inadequate
in making the victim whole because the plaintiffs must pay the additional
tax burden, which is the fault of the employer, either out of their own
pocket or out of the funds used to compensate the plaintiffs for the
damages suffered, thus reducing the amount of the damage award the
plaintiffs truly receive.
D. Legislative Attempts to Address the Negative Tax Consequences for
Title VII Back-Pay Awards
In recent years, Congress has made several legislative attempts to
offset the negative tax consequences of lump-sum back-pay awards.70 The
majority of Congress’ proposed legislative efforts employ income
averaging to counter the negative tax consequences of Title VII awards.71
Income averaging allows taxpayers to compute taxable income by
averaging the payer’s current annual income with that of previous years.72
While it is worth noting that there are several benefits to income
63. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426, 441 (3d Cir. 2009) (first quoting
Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988); and then quoting Spencer v. WalMart Stores, 469 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 2006)).
64. Johnson, supra note 21, at 36.
65. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 U.S. 405, 418–20 (1975).
66. Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 441.
67. Id.
68. See generally cases cited supra note 19.
69. See generally EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015).
70. See generally sources cited supra note 18.
71. See generally id.
72. Income Averaging, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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averaging,73 it would not make a victim whole to the same extent that
gross-ups do.74 Further, Congress never successfully enacted the proposed
legislation.75
The first attempt at a legislative solution to the negative tax penalty
was the proposed Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act of 1999.76 The 1999 Act
recommended amendments to the Internal Revenue Code that would
exclude amounts awarded to a victim of unlawful discrimination from
gross income.77 The Act also permitted income averaging for back-pay and
front-pay awards received as the result of discrimination claims.78
Congress did not enact this legislation, and a renamed version of the Act
was later introduced to the House of Representatives in 2001.79 Congress
did not enact this second, renamed version of the Act either, and the bill
was reintroduced a third time to both the House of Representatives and the
Senate as the Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act of 2003.80 Though Congress
included portions of the Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act of 2003 in the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, it omitted the sections of the Tax
Fairness Act addressing the adverse tax consequences on pecuniary
damages awarded to discrimination victims.81
Congress next attempted to counter the negative tax consequences
through the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2007.82 This legislation sought
to amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow income averaging for backpay and front-pay awards received for Title VII discrimination claims.83
Additionally, the Act proposed an amendment to the Internal Revenue
73. There are several benefits associated with income averaging. First, this
method “creates a sense of horizontal equity among employment discrimination
plaintiffs and non-discrimination employees, placing the victims of
discrimination in the same position as if the discrimination never occurred.”
Second, the income averaging approach may be easier to apply than the gross-up
method because it does not require the courts to hear expert testimony and conduct
complex calculations. See Barca, supra note 31, at 704.
74. See discussion infra Part IV.
75. See generally sources cited supra note 18. It should also be noted that at
the time of writing, the recent election of a Democratic President and a
Democratic controlled Congress may result in another legislative attempt to
address the negative tax consequences of Title VII lump-sum back-pay awards.
76. See H.R. Res. 1997, 106th Cong. (1999).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Barca, supra note 31, at 697–98.
80. Id. at 698.
81. Id.
82. See generally S. Res. 1689, 110th Cong. (2007).
83. See id.
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Code that would exclude gross income amounts received from unlawful
discrimination claims.84 Once again, Congress did not enact the bill.85
Legislators reintroduced the bill in 2009 and 2011, but it ultimately failed
to become law.86
In 2013, Congress introduced the Civil Justice Tax Fairness Act.87
This legislation attempted to amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow:
(1) amounts received by judgment or settlement for unlawful
discrimination as lump sums or periodic payments to be excluded from
gross income; (2) income averaging for back-pay and front-pay awards;
and (3) an exemption from the alternative minimum tax for any tax benefit
resulting from income averaging.88 Once again, Congress failed to enact
the law.89 Currently, no tax legislation directly addresses the negative tax
consequences of Title VII lump-sum back-pay awards, causing the federal
circuit courts to inconsistently award damages to plaintiffs seeking relief
for their employment discrimination claims.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHETHER GROSS-UPS ARE PERMITTED FOR
TITLE VII BACK-PAY AWARDS
The federal circuits are split on whether gross-ups are permitted for
Title VII back-pay awards. The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits
grant district courts the discretion to award gross-ups for Title VII backpay awards.90 The D.C. Circuit, however, has explicitly rejected gross-ups
of back pay to cover the negative tax liability.91

84. See id.
85. Johnson, supra note 21, at 57.
86. Id.
87. Civil Justice Tax Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. Res. 2509, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. Res. 1224, 113th Cong. (2013).
88. See Civil Justice Tax Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. Res. 2509, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. Res. 1224, 113th Cong. (2013). The alternative minimum tax applies to
taxpayers with high economic income and ensures that those taxpayers pay at least
a minimum amount of tax. See Topic No. 556 Alternative Minimum Tax, IRS (Jan.
2021), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc556 [https://perma.cc/QBP9-ZNZH].
89. Johnson, supra note 21, at 57.
90. See generally cases cited supra note 19.
91. See generally Dashnaw v. Peña, 12 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Fogg v.
Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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A. The Tenth Circuit: Sears v. Atchinson
The first federal circuit to address a tax component for Title VII backpay awards was the Tenth Circuit in Sears v. Atchinson.92 In Sears,
plaintiffs filed a Title VII class action lawsuit against multiple railroad
companies, including Atchinson, Topeka, Santa Fe Railway, and the
United Transportation Union.93 The plaintiffs alleged that these companies
engaged in discriminatory policies and practices against Black
employees.94 The district court found that both Santa Fe and the United
Transportation Union violated Title VII, and the court granted the
plaintiffs an additional tax component in the back-pay award to counter
the additional tax liability.95 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by including a gross-up in the
back-pay award.96 The Tenth Circuit granted the tax component to
compensate class members for the additional tax liability arising from a
lump-sum award of over seventeen years of back pay.97 The Tenth Circuit
noted that a tax component may not always be appropriate in a Title VII
case, and it is up to the discretion of the trial court to award damages to
discrimination victims in a way that will make them whole.98 In the Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning, the court recognized that the court-ordered back-pay
awards would likely place the victims in the highest income tax bracket,
where they would not have been otherwise.99 Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit noted that income averaging was an insufficient solution because
nearly 40% of the class members had died by the time of the suit and, thus,
they would not benefit from income averaging alone.100

92. See Sears v. Atchinson, 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984).
93. Sears v. Atchinson, 454 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D. Kans. 1978).
94. Id. at 160–61.
95. See id.
96. See Sears, 749 F.2d 1451.
97. Id. at 1456.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (noting that estates of deceased taxpayers are not eligible for income
averaging under Treas. Reg. § 1.1303-1(a)).
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B. The Third Circuit: Eshelman v. Agere Systems
The Third Circuit has followed the Tenth Circuit’s decision by
allowing gross-up awards for Title VII actions.101 In Eshelman v. Agere
Systems, Joan Eshelman brought suit against her former employer, Agere
Systems, Inc., claiming Agere discriminated against her in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).102 Specifically, Eshelman
contended that she was terminated as a result of a disability stemming from
her chemotherapy treatment for breast cancer.103 Eshelman had worked at
Agere for over 20 years and had obtained the position of supervisor of the
Chief Information Office of Agere’s facility in Reading, Pennsylvania.104
At trial, the jury determined that Agere discriminated against Eshelman in
violation of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and
awarded her $170,000 in back pay and $30,000 in compensatory
damages.105 After the jury rendered its verdict, the district court also
granted Eshelman a gross-up to offset the negative tax consequences that
would stem from her back-pay award.106
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding Eshelman additional compensation for the
negative tax consequences of receiving her lump-sum back-pay award.107
The Third Circuit reasoned that the principal purpose of employment
discrimination statutes is to make persons whole “for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination.”108 Further, the court
noted that district courts maintain wide discretion to award “a just result”
based on the circumstances of each case.109 In exercising their discretion,
the district courts should attempt to restore the employee to his or her
economic status quo had the discrimination not occurred.110 The Third
Circuit also noted that a plaintiff is not presumptively entitled to a gross-

101. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426, 443 (3d Cir. 2009); EEOC v.
N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015); Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc.,
874 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2017).
102. Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 430.
103. See id. at 430–31.
104. Id. at 430.
105. Id. at 432.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 443.
108. Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 440 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
109. Id.
110. See id. (quoting In re Cont’l Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 1997)).

610

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

up.111 As such, the employee bears the burden of showing the extent of the
injury she has suffered and the amount of relief needed to make her whole,
as it varies from case to case.112
C. The Seventh Circuit: EEOC v. Northern Star Hospitality
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of tax adjustment awards in
EEOC v. Northern Star Hospitality.113 In Northern Star Hospitality, the
Seventh Circuit joined the Third and Tenth circuits, affirming a tax
component award for Title VII lump-sum back-pay awards.114 The
plaintiff’s receipt of $43,300.50 in back pay would have bumped him into
a higher tax bracket.115 This resulting tax increase would not have occurred
had Mr. Miller received the pay on a regular, scheduled basis.116 In other
words, not accounting for the negative tax consequences meant that Mr.
Miller’s award would be less than the amount he would have received had
his employer not unlawfully terminated him.117 The court reasoned that
“without the tax component award, he will not be made whole . . .
offend[ing] Title VII’s remedial scheme.”118 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the award
and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.119
D. The Ninth Circuit: Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc.
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of gross-ups in
Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc.120 Arthur Clemens Jr. sued his employer,
Qwest Corporation, for race discrimination in violation of Title VII. 121
After a trial, the jury awarded Clemens over $157,000 for lost wages and
benefits, over $275,000 for emotional distress, and $100,000 in punitive
damages.122 The district court also granted Clemens’s motion for

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
2017).
121.
122.

Id. at 443.
Id.
See EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See generally Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
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attorney’s fees but denied his request for a gross-up.123 In refusing to
exercise its discretion to grant Clemens a gross-up, the lower court
reasoned that because of the lack of guidance from the Ninth Circuit and
the circuit split over the issue, the award was inappropriate.124
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit joined the Third, Seventh, and Tenth
circuits by reversing the district court’s decision to deny Clemens’s
request for a tax consequence adjustment.125 The Ninth Circuit ruled that
the decision to award a gross-up, and the appropriate amount, is left to the
discretion of the district court.126 The court also noted that there are
situations in which a gross-up is not appropriate, such as when the amount
of the gross-up is difficult to determine or would be very small.127
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in
EEOC v. Northern Star Hospitality, holding that the party seeking a grossup bears the burden of showing an income tax disparity and proving any
adjustment award needed to counter the negative tax treatment.128 The
court refused to rule on whether a gross-up was appropriate for the issue
at hand and remanded the decision to the district court.129
E. The D.C. Circuit: Dashnaw v. Peña
Conversely, the D.C. Circuit has continuously refused to permit grossup awards in Title VII actions. First, in the 1994 case Dashnaw v. Peña,
the D.C. Circuit refused to allow additional compensation for the negative
tax consequences of Title VII awards.130 The Federal Maritime
Administration (MARAD) hired Dashnaw as an engineer in 1967.131 He
filed a complaint in 1977, alleging employment discrimination on the basis
of age, national origin, religion, and race.132 Dashnaw primarily based his
claims on the ground that he was denied promotions that instead went to
younger candidates.133 Ultimately, the lower court found MARAD liable
for age discrimination, but the proceedings were prolonged for multiple

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015).
Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1117.
Dashnaw v. Peña, 12 F.3d 1112, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reasons, including Dashnaw’s retirement.134 In 1992, the district court
ordered that Dashnaw be reinstated and receive back pay from 1975
through the date of the order.135 On appeal, Dashnaw contended that the
district court should have granted him additional compensation to cover
the higher taxes he would have to pay because he received his back pay in
a lump sum, rather than as salary paid over a number of years.136 The D.C.
Circuit held that the general rule from Albemarle—that victims of
discrimination should be made whole137—does not support additional
compensation for negative tax consequences from lump-sum back-pay
awards.138 Further, the court noted that it knew of “no authority for such
relief.”139
Throughout the D.C. Circuit, district courts have continued to follow
the Dashnaw ruling, refusing to recognize tax gross-ups as an available
remedy.140 Over a decade later, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its Dashnaw
ruling in the 2007 case Fogg v. Gonzales.141 In Fogg, a former United
States Deputy Marshal brought an action alleging that the United States
Marshals Service (USMS) had discriminated against him on the grounds
of race in violation of Title VII.142 A jury awarded Fogg $4 million in
damages, which the district court reduced to the statutory maximum of
$300,000.143 The court granted Fogg’s motion for equitable relief and
extended his award to include back pay through the date of his dismissal.144
On remand, a different district court judge granted Fogg the back-pay
award with an additional gross-up of 14% to offset the negative tax
consequences of the lump-sum award.145 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the district court’s gross-up award, finding that the district court
abused its discretion and directly contradicted the Dashnaw holding.146

134. Id.
135. Id. at 1114–15.
136. Id.
137. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
138. Dashnaw, 12 F.3d at 1116.
139. Id. (“We know of no authority for such relief, and appellee points to none.
Given the complete lack of support in existing case law for tax gross-ups, we
decline so to extend the law in this case. We therefore reject Dashnaw’s request
for additional compensation to cover his tax liability.”).
140. Johnson, supra note 21, at 47.
141. See generally Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
142. Id. at 449.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 455.
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Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the district court’s gross-up award
on the basis of “binding precedent,” reaffirming the federal circuit split.147
The D.C. Circuit’s view goes against the primary purpose of
employment discrimination statutes, which is to make persons whole for
injuries suffered because of unlawful employment discrimination.148 To
resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court should permit gross-ups in
cases where back pay is awarded for employment discrimination and
articulate factors for lower courts to consider when determining the
amount of the gross-up. Allowing gross-up awards is the best solution to
make victims of discrimination whole because it shifts the additional tax
burden onto the employer instead of the victim or the public.149
Additionally, establishing set factors would make calculating gross-ups
significantly easier on the lower courts and give plaintiffs a better
understanding of whether a court will award a gross-up.150
III. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ON TITLE VII AWARDS
The federal income tax system often causes adverse tax consequences
for lump-sum back-pay awards.151 First, Title VII awards granted to
victims are subject to federal income taxation.152 Second, the Internal
Revenue Code’s annual accounting system and the progressive tax
structure of the federal income tax system result in a more substantial tax
burden on victims than if the award had been made in payments over
time.153
A. Title VII Awards Are Subject to Federal Income Taxation
The awards granted to victims in Title VII actions are generally
subject to federal income tax.154 In U.S. v. Burke, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) paid back pay to affected employees as part of a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII.155 The TVA withheld federal income
taxes from the award and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Fogg, 492 F.3d at 456.
See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
See generally Barca, supra note 31, at 686.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
See Barca, supra note 31, at 686.
See Burke, 504 U.S. 229.
Id.
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victims’ claims for a refund of the withheld taxes.156 The district court
ruled that the settlement proceeds could not be excluded from gross
income as damages received for personal injuries under 26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(2).157 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the damage
awards could be excluded from gross income for federal income tax
purposes because the discrimination constituted a personal, tort-like injury
to the victims.158 The Supreme Court held that a statute such as Title VII,
“whose sole remedial focus is the award of back wages,” does not remedy
a tort-like personal injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and the
applicable regulations.159 In other words, the Supreme Court held that
back-pay awards received for Title VII claims are not excludable from
gross income and are therefore subject to federal income taxation.160
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance in Commissioner v.
Schleier.161 Erich Schleier, an employee of United Airlines, Inc., was fired
when he reached the age of 60, pursuant to company policy.162 Schleier
then filed a complaint alleging that United violated the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967.163 When Schleier filed his 1986 federal
income tax return, he included the back-pay award he received in his
settlement with United but did not include the portion of the settlement
attributed to liquidated damages.164 The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued a deficiency notice, asserting that Schleier should have
included liquidated damages in his gross income.165 Schleier then initiated
proceedings in Tax Court, alleging that he properly excluded the liquidated
damages and seeking a refund for the taxes he paid on the settlement’s
back-pay award.166
The Tax Court ruled that the entire settlement, both the back pay and
liquidated damages, constituted damages received on account of personal
injuries or sickness within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) of the Internal

156. Id.
157. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (“In general . . . gross income does not
include . . . the amount of any damages . . . received (whether by suit or
agreement . . .) . . . on account of personal physical injuries . . . .”).
158. Burke, 504 U.S. 229.
159. Id. at 241.
160. Id.
161. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
162. Id. at 325.
163. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (enacted by Congress to protect
employees against age discrimination in the workplace).
164. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Revenue Code and was therefore excludable from gross income.167 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.168 The Supreme Court
reversed and ruled that because of the plain language of § 104(a)(2), the
text of the regulation implementing § 104(a)(2), and the court’s reasoning
in Burke, awards for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
are not excludable from gross income, and thus, the awards are subject to
federal income tax.169
B. The Internal Revenue Code and the Adverse Consequences to LumpSum Back-Pay Awards
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code defines gross income as “all
income from whatever source derived” except as otherwise provided by
the tax code.170 Under § 104(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, back-pay
and front-pay awards in Title VII actions are subject to federal income tax
because they are not awarded as a remedy for a physical injury.171 The
inclusion of these awards in gross income often causes harsh tax
consequences for Title VII plaintiffs.172
The main sources of the negative tax consequences are the Internal
Revenue Code’s annual accounting system and the progressive tax
structure of the federal income tax system.173 First, § 441 of the Internal
Revenue Code requires a taxpayer’s income to be calculated based on
gains received during the calendar year in question.174 Accordingly, if an
injured plaintiff receives a lump-sum back-pay award attributable to
multiple years of discrimination, the entire lump sum is taxed in the year
the remedy is awarded.175

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. I.R.C. § 61(a).
171. See I.R.C. § 104(a); see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992);
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323.
172. See generally Barca, supra note 31, at 685–86.
173. Id. at 688.
174. I.R.C. § 441; see also United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.,
532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001) (applying income taxes to back pay for the year the
settlement was paid, not the years the wages should have been paid); Rev. Rul.
78-336, 1978-2 C.B. 255 (ruling that dismissed federal employees must report
income for back pay in the year paid); 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (2016).
175. See I.R.C. § 441; see also Barca, supra note 31, at 687–88.
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Second, because the United States uses a progressive tax structure, the
marginal tax rate176 increases as the amount of taxable income increases.177
As a result, victims who receive large back-pay awards are often taxed at
a higher, if not the highest, marginal tax rate and have a higher net income
tax liability than if they had earned the pay over a period of time rather
than in a lump-sum award.178 Thus, the victim pays more in taxes than he
or she would have if the discrimination had not occurred and the wages
were earned in an ordinary fashion during employment.179
C. An Illustration of the Negative Tax Effect Under the Current Income
Tax System
To fully illustrate the tax effect of lump-sum back-pay awards under
the current tax law, suppose a court awards a victim of employment
discrimination $200,000 in a lump-sum back-pay award in 2020. The
victim is unmarried and not a head of household.180 Prior to the lump-sum
back-pay award, the employee’s taxable income for the year was $45,000,
placing the employee in a tax bracket with a marginal tax rate of 22%.181
After receiving the back-pay award, however, the victim’s taxable income
for the year increases to $245,000, raising the employee three tax brackets
and imposing a 35% marginal tax rate.182 Thus, under the current tax
system, the employee’s wages and salary awarded in a back-pay award
will be taxed at a higher rate than if he or she received the payment over

176. The marginal tax rate is the highest rate at which a taxpayer pays taxes.
A taxpayer’s effective tax rate is the percentage of the payer’s total income paid
in taxes. See JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL TAXATION PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 229 (5th ed. 2018); see also
Marginal Tax Rate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“In a tax scheme,
the rate applicable to the last dollar of income earned by the taxpayer.”).
177. The United States federal income tax system uses a progressive tax rate,
meaning the rate rises with income. Currently the seven tax rates are 10%, 12%,
22%, 24%, 32%, 35%, and 37%. Each rate applies to a different segment of
income known as a tax bracket. See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 176.
178. Barca, supra note 31, at 688.
179. Id.
180. Tax filing status determines, among other things, income tax rate. Status
is classified as Single, Married Filing Jointly, or Head of Household. For the 2020
Tax Brackets, see Amir El-Sibaie, 2020 Tax Brackets, THE TAX FOUNDATION
(Nov.
2019),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20191114132604/2020-TaxBrackets-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WHZ-2LUP].
181. For the 2020 Tax Brackets, see id.
182. Id.
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time instead of in a lump sum.183 The victim pays more in federal income
tax, reducing the net remedy he or she received in damages for the
discrimination suffered. Because the victim pays more in federal income
tax than he or she would have if the discrimination had not occurred, the
government profits off the discrimination at the expense of the victim, but
the employee is not made whole. A tax gross-up in conjunction with a
lump-sum back-pay award is the only way to fully compensate a victim of
employment discrimination.
IV. A SOLUTION: PERMITTING GROSS-UPS AND DETERMINING WHAT
FACTORS DISTRICT COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER
Because legislation has continuously failed to sufficiently address the
issue of gross-ups, the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split and
permit courts to award Title VII discrimination victims tax adjustment
awards. Additionally, the Supreme Court should establish factors for
lower courts to use in determining whether to award gross-ups and in what
amount.
A. Judicial and Legislative Power to Allow Gross-Ups and Make Victims
Whole
An established principle of the American legal system is that injured
plaintiffs should be made whole for injuries suffered.184 In Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, the Third Circuit recognized that adopting a “make whole”
standard is necessary to restore a victim to the economic position in which
he or she would have been had the discrimination not occurred.185 Many
courts, however, refuse to recognize the “make whole” doctrine in the
context of the negative tax consequences from an award of lump-sum back
pay.186
Nonetheless, Congress intended federal employment discrimination
statutes to make injured plaintiffs whole, giving courts expansive
discretion to award remedies to victims.187 Additionally, in Albemarle, the
Supreme Court stated that the principal purpose of the equitable powers
that Congress granted to courts hearing discrimination actions is “to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
183. See Barca, supra note 31, at 688.
184. Johnson, supra note 21, at 52.
185. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1121 (3d. Cir. 1980).
186. Johnson, supra note 21, at 52–53.
187. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), 216(b), 1132(a)(3)(B) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(1).
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discrimination.”188 Thus, the considerable discretion that Title VII
provides to courts to ensure adequate compensation,189 along with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Albemarle, indicates that courts have the
authority to award gross-ups in Title VII actions.190
Without a gross-up, employment discrimination victims do not receive
their full remedy. Employees are bumped into higher tax brackets and pay
more in taxes than if they had received their salaries and wages over time
instead of in a lump sum.191 In other words, without a gross-up, an
employee does not receive his or her full award in a Title VII action and
is not “made whole” from the discrimination suffered during
employment.192 The gross-up method is the optimal solution to make a
victim of employment discrimination whole, and the D.C. Circuit’s view
goes against the “make whole” principal.193
In Dashnaw, the D.C. Circuit found that there was “no authority” for
gross-ups, stating that “[a]bsent an arrangement by voluntary settlement
of the parties, the general rule that victims of discrimination should be
made whole does not support ‘gross ups’ of back pay to cover tax
liability.”194 But the majority of federal circuit courts have found the
authority to award gross-ups.195 Further, Congress has armed courts with
wide discretion to adequately compensate victims.196 Throughout the
almost 60 years since the enactment of Title VII, Congress has
continuously expanded the courts’ authority, allowing courts to order
corrective action where appropriate197 or any other equitable relief the
courts deem appropriate.198 This continuous expansion of remedies
indicates that Congress sought to increase the means by which courts could

188. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
189. Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
190. See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418.
191. See Barca, supra note 31, at 688.
192. Johnson, supra note 21, at 57.
193. See generally Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1116.
194. Dashnaw v. Peña, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
195. See generally Eshelman v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426, 443 (3d Cir. 2009);
EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015); Clemens, 874 F.3d 1113.
196. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII,
§ 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261; Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 104-07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (2000)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
197. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g).
198. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000)).
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provide a remedy to victims of discrimination.199 The D.C. Circuit’s view
goes against the general rule of making an employee whole for injuries
suffered as the result of unlawful discrimination in the workplace,200
essentially preventing employees from becoming whole in Title VII
actions and discriminating against the victims for a second time.201
Prior failed legislative solutions also would not sufficiently make a
victim whole.202 While income averaging may significantly lighten the
negative tax consequences on an employee, the remedy does not
adequately make an employee whole from the discrimination suffered
during employment.203 First, under this method the victim’s award is still
being taxed.204 To truly make an employee whole, some critics of income
averaging contend that the victim’s award should be exempt from taxable
gross income all together.205 The Supreme Court, however, has explicitly
ruled that back-pay lump-sum awards are subject to federal income tax
and must be included in taxable gross income, absent a legislative
change.206 Thus, to prevent victims from paying more in federal income
taxes, the courts should shift the additional tax burden from the victim to
the employer through a gross-up.207
Second, public policy disfavors income averaging.208 Under this
approach, the government will collect less tax revenue because it will tax
pecuniary damages awarded for discrimination actions at a lower tax
rate.209 Consequently, the government will collect less in federal income
taxes under an income averaging method.210 Under the gross-up approach,
the employer pays the additional tax burden, letting the government collect
the full amount of tax revenue and shifting the additional tax burden from
the employee to the employer. By shifting the tax burden to the employer
through a gross-up, courts would force employers to be responsible for the
full consequences of their discrimination.211 Pushing these costs onto

199. Canney, supra note 46, at 1116.
200. Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1116.
201. Id.
202. See Barca, supra note 31, at 704–05.
203. See id.
204. See generally United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992); see also
Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995).
205. See Barca, supra note 31, at 704.
206. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 241; see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327.
207. See Barca, supra note 31, at 704–05.
208. Id. at 705.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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employers through a gross-up rather than onto the public through foregone
tax revenue is a strong justification for the use of gross-ups over the
income averaging method proposed by Congress.212
Conversely, some courts find it difficult to apply the gross-up method
and calculate a victim’s award.213 Expert testimony and complex
calculations are typically used to compute gross-ups, making it a costly
and lengthy process to determine the award.214 Part of the difficult
calculation stems from the lack of set factors for lower courts to use when
determining gross-up awards.215 Thus, the Supreme Court must establish
factors for lower courts to consider when determining whether they should
award a gross-up in a particular case and the amount of the award.
B. Factors for District Courts to Consider in Determining Gross-Up
Awards
The Third and Ninth circuits established starting points for courts to
use when determining gross-up awards in Eshelman v. Agere Systems and
Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc.216 In Eshelman, the Third Circuit noted that
a plaintiff is not presumed to be entitled to a gross-up and the relief
required to make an employee whole varies from case to case.217
Additionally, in Clemens, the Ninth Circuit recognized that there will be
many instances where a gross-up is not appropriate.218 Specifically, the
court noted two circumstances in which gross-ups would not be a suitable
remedy.219 First, if it would be too difficult for a court to determine the
proper gross-up amount, a gross-up is likely not proper.220 Second, the
negligibility of the amount at issue may make the remedy inappropriate.221
Thus, if the tax adjustment would be difficult to calculate or would be an
insignificant amount, a gross-up is not appropriate.222

212. Id.
213. See id. at 704.
214. Id.
215. See Pollard v. Dupont De Nemours, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 865, 883 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003).
216. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426, 443 (3d Cir. 2009).
217. Id.
218. Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017).
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id.
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Additionally, courts should consider other pecuniary burdens the
plaintiff will suffer as a result of adverse tax consequences.223 In other
words, not all income is taxed equally, and courts should consider both the
plaintiff’s income tax liability and any other liabilities under the Internal
Revenue Code that plaintiffs can prove that they would not have incurred
“but for” the discrimination.224 Courts should also take into account
missed deductions, tax credits, and any economic benefits the plaintiff was
unable to enjoy because of the employer’s discrimination.225 For example,
if a victim receives state or federal unemployment benefits, the court
should consider tax consequences and other economic benefits related to
unemployment assistance when calculating the gross-up award.226 Under
most unemployment programs, unemployment compensation received
during the year must be included in gross income.227 Because a Title VII
victim is only receiving unemployment compensation as a result of the
employer’s unlawful discrimination, courts should also consider this
additional compensation included in the victim’s gross income when
determining the award.228
As noted in nearly all federal circuit court cases allowing gross-ups,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the increased tax burden with
specificity.229 To prevent abuse and mistakes, courts should require
detailed accounting calculations and records in awarding gross-up
awards.230 If a victim is able to meet this burden of specificity, the burden
of proving why a court should not award a gross-up should then transfer
to the opposing party. Thus, the employer would then bear the burden of
proving the Clemens factors to prevent the court from awarding a grossup.
The general method lower courts currently employ to calculate grossups includes: (1) calculating the taxable income of the plaintiff the year of
the award; (2) determining the taxes owed for the tax year; (3) determining
the effective tax rate for that year; (4) determining the effective tax rate
for the plaintiff’s normal one-year salary with the discriminating
223. Canney, supra note 46, at 1134.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Topic No. 418 Unemployment Compensation, IRS (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc418 [https://perma.cc/F54M-DP8G].
228. See Canney, supra note 46, at 1134.
229. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426, 443 (3d Cir. 2009); Clemens
v. CenturyLink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017); E.E.O.C. v. N. Star
Hosp., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015).
230. Canney, supra note 46, at 1134.
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employer; (5) determining the difference between the effective tax rates in
a normal-salary year and the lump-sum-award year; and (6) multiplying
the lump-sum taxable income by the difference between the effective and
normal tax rates.231
Thus, courts should take into account all of these factors when
considering and determining gross-up awards.232 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should specify that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
with specificity the increased tax burden. If the victim is able to prove with
specificity the increased tax burden, the burden should then shift to the
employer to prove that the gross-up would either be too difficult to
calculate or too small of an amount and thus should not be awarded.
Further, the Supreme Court should also adopt the general method lower
courts have implemented to calculate the gross-up amount, while
additionally considering other pecuniary burdens the plaintiff will suffer
as a result of adverse tax consequences.
Using the prior example, if a discrimination victim has a taxable
income of $45,000 prior to the award and is granted a $200,000 back-pay
lump-sum award, the victim is then pushed from a 22% tax bracket into a
35% tax bracket, with taxable income for the year of $245,000. The
$200,000 will be taxed at a disproportionately higher rate than if the
$200,000 had been earned over time during employment as normal salary
and wages. To prove that a gross-up is required to counter the negative tax
consequences, the victim will bear the burden of showing with specificity
the increased tax burden.233 Here, the victim’s income tax liability will
increase from $5,689.78 to $60,545234 in the year of the award. Thus, the
gross-up would likely not be too difficult to calculate and would be a fairly
significant amount, satisfying the Clemons factors.235 The court should
consider whether the victim received unemployment compensation as a
result of the discrimination and whether that compensation was included
in the victim’s gross income.236 The court should then employ the general
method of the lower courts and calculate a gross-up for the victim.237 Only
with this gross-up will the victim be “made whole” from the
discrimination.
231. Id. at 1135–36.
232. See generally id.
233. See Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 443; Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1117; N. Star Hosp.,
777 F.3d at 904.
234. The victim’s income tax liability was calculated using the 2020 tax
brackets. See El-Sibaie, supra note 180.
235. See Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1117.
236. Canney, supra note 46, at 1134.
237. Id.
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Establishing a set of factors for the lower courts to use would create
more consistency in the lower courts and, as a result, give plaintiffs a better
understanding of whether a court will award a gross-up in their case.238
Additionally, setting factors would make calculating gross-ups
significantly easier on the lower courts by narrowing the considerations
used in the calculation, determining circumstances where gross-ups would
be inappropriate, and ensuring a general method for courts to use in
calculating gross-ups.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Northern Star Hospitality
correctly permitted a gross-up to offset the negative tax consequences of
Mr. Miller’s lump-sum back-pay award.239 Without a gross-up, Mr. Miller
would not have received his full award and would not have been made
whole from the discrimination he suffered at Sparx.240 The Third, Ninth,
and Tenth circuits have also correctly permitted gross-up awards.241 The
D.C. Circuit’s view goes against the fundamental purpose of employment
discrimination statutes and prevents victims from being made whole as
though the discrimination did not occur.242
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have provided courts with the
discretion and tools to permit gross-ups.243 Without an adjustment for the
negative tax consequences caused by lump-sum back-pay awards, victims
of employment discrimination are not made whole. Further, Congress has
failed to enact legislation offering a viable solution.244 Thus, the Supreme
Court should resolve the circuit split and permit gross-ups for lump-sum
back-pay awards while also establishing factors for lower courts to
consider in deciding and calculating gross-up awards.

238. Id.
239. See generally EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2015).
240. See generally id. at 904.
241. See generally Eshelman v. Agere Sys., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009); N.
Star Hosp., 777 F.3d 898; Clemens v. CenturyLink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2017); Sears v. Atchinson, 749 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1984).
242. See Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1116–17.
243. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); see also
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255;
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat.
103, 104–07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000)); Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
244. See sources cited supra note 18.

